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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael S. Stocks appeals from his judgment of conviction for Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor Under 16. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
In January 2011, A.C., who is Stocks' nine year old niece, told her parents 
Stocks touched her on her "private parts." (R., p.8.) Law enforcement officers 
initiated an investigation and discovered that Stocks touched A.C.'s vagina 
underneath her clothing and digitally penetrated her on numerous occasions 
while he was living with AC. and her parents. (R., pp.8-10.) Stocks also 
performed oral sex on AC. approximately five times and he touched A.C. in the 
"chest" area underneath her clothing. (R., pp.9-10.) AC. told law enforcement 
officers Stocks tried "to put his thing up my thing" several times and he "touched 
his very private part against her very private part." (R., p.10.) Stocks admitted to 
performing oral sex on AC. and repeatedly touching her vagina over the course 
of several weeks. 1 (PSI, pp.4-6.) 
The state charged Stocks with three counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Under 16. (R., pp.27-29.) Pursuant to a Non-Binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement, 
Stocks pled guilty to one count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under 16 and the 
state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (R., pp.51-52; 5/26/11 Tr., p.1, 
Ls.19-23.) The state also agreed "not to recommend any harsher sentence than 
1 Stocks also admitted to molesting either a seven or 10 year old girl 10 to 20 
times when he was between the ages of 15 and 17. (PSI, p.12; Psychosexual 
Evaluation, p.8.) 
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recommended in the Pre-Sentence Investigation." (R., pp.51-52; 5/26/11 Tr., p.1, 
L.24 - p.2, L.1.) 
The presentence investigator recommended that "[a]lthough the 
Psychosexual Evaluation concludes Mr. Stocks is an appropriate candidate for 
[community] supervision at this time, I feel a period of incarceration is warranted 
in this case, due to the fact that Mr. Stocks is a high-moderate risk of sexual 
offending in the future and because there is an additional victim in his past." (PSI, 
p.15.) The presentence investigator also recommended that the district court 
retain jurisdiction. (PSI, p.15.) 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel began by stating "Stocks 
admits that he has a very serious problem and he also admits that he has done 
some terrible things .... " (6/30/11 Tr., p.4, L.24 - p.5, L.1.) Defense counsel 
mentioned the facts contained in the PSI, but noted "it is easy to forget that 
wrapped up in these problems and - and these issues that are before the Court, 
at the core is a very good person who has a deep rooted problem and someone 
who needs help." (6/30/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-9.) Defense counsel stated "I can 
represent to the Court that I believe we have a very good person and he does 
need help." (6/30/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-11.) 
After discussing Stocks' age and criminal history, defense counsel 
discussed Stocks' background and stated "I would reflect to the Court that he has 
a ton of family support, as the Court is aware by reviewing the presentence 
investigation, his friends and his family presented many letters showing his [sic] 
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care for" Stocks. (6/30/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-24.) Defense counsel discussed Stocks' 
background again and then addressed protection of society. (6/30/11 Tr., p.6, 
Ls.1-19.) Defense counsel reviewed Stocks' conduct while he was out on bond, 
mentioning "there was never an allegation that [Stocks] was any [sic] other than 
where he was supposed to be" and that Stocks "has had no violations of the 
Court's order of release." (6/30/11 Tr., p.6, L.20 - p.7, L.12.) 
Turning next to the findings of Dr. Lindsey in the psychosexual evaluation, 
defense counsel discussed the "negative disclosures" Stocks made and quoted 
the recommendation of Dr. Lindsey that "[w]hile Mr. Stocks is found to be high-
moderate risk of sexual offending in the future, it is my opinion that does not 
require incarceration for community protection purposes at this time. As long as 
aggressive probationary supervision and aggressive sex offender treatment 
programing [sic] are in place for him." (6/30/11 Tr., p.7, L.21 - p.8, L.9 (internal 
quotations omitted).) Defense counsel argued that "given his success on the 
ankle monitor, given Dr. Lindsey's recommendation we believe that the 
community can clearly be protected by aggressive probation." (6/30/11 Tr., p.8, 
Ls.9-11.) 
The next argument defense counsel made addressed deterrence and 
punishment. (6/30/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-15.) Defense counsel argued that probation 
would deter Stocks and "the community as a whole" and the type of probation 
recommended by Dr. Lindsey would serve the sentencing objective of 
"punishment" because it involves "[c]lose intensive monitoring." (6/30/11 Tr., p.8, 
Ls.12-16.) Defense counsel discussed the details of Dr. Lindsey's probation plan 
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and argued that Stocks would also be punished for his crime by having to 
register as a sex offender. (6/30/11 Tr., p.8, L.15 - p.9, L.11.) 
Defense counsel addressed retribution and restitution by discussing the 
letter submitted by the victim's parents: 
There is not a seeking of punishment, grand punishment, there is 
not a seeking of retribution, there is no request that I have seen for 
any restitution in this case although that may be some time down 
the road, but the victims - the victim is specifically not requesting 
anything other than Mike get help and they are not here today, to 
address the Court. 
(6/30/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-24.) Defense counsel went on to discuss rehabilitation 
and stated "I am not a hundred percent sure that we all wouldn't benefit from the 
Retained Jurisdiction Program in some fashion. [Stocks] would as well." (6/30/11 
Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9.) Defense counsel then asked "what's the best way to get 
[Stocks] back into the community" and argued that placing Stocks on probation 
would be preferable to the retained jurisdiction program. (6/30/11 Tr., p.10, 
Ls.10-17.) Defense counsel concluded by recommending "a lengthy and 
aggressive probation" and stated: 
We believe that he'll succeed in this. My firm belief is - is that you 
will never see this young man again back before you. And although 
we have a recommendation and I believe that the State will be 
recommending the Retained Jurisdiction Program as well to-and 
we - because of the agreement - the plea agreement was is that 
the State would be recommending what the - and concurring with 
the pre-sentence report to retained jurisdiction. We hope that this 
Court will give Mike an intermediate chance on probation before 
sending him away to a correctional facility. We do believe that 
Probation is punishment. I think he can be successful and I think 
this is the best way of getting him back into our community. 
(6/30/11 Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11, L.7.) 
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In response to the defense argument for probation, the prosecutor 
addressed the issue of restitution and discussed the letters that were submitted 
by various individuals on Stocks' behalf. (6/30/11 Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.22; PSI 
Attachment.2) The prosecutor commented "they're general letters it appears and 
the pre-sentence investigator noted this-it appears that many of them are either 
unaware or just chose not to mention any specifics of the case today and also 
most of the letters are unsigned." (6/30/11 Tr., p.12, Ls.12-15; PSI, p.10.) The 
prosecutor then quoted from portions of several of the letters that discussed 
Stocks integrity and character. (6/30/11 Tr., p.13, L.4 - p.14, L.2; PSI 
Attachment.) After reviewing the letters, the prosecutor stated: 
As is the case, in child molestation cases, such as this that is not 
[atypical] your honor. In fact it is typical that a child molester will 
come to Court and have many people step up to his defense and 
say it can't be Michael Stocks, not this person, I know him to be a 
great person, caring kind. Unfortunately, in this case Your Honor, 
as the Court knows and as Mr. Stocks has admitted in the one 
count of Lewd Conduct that he has pled guilty to for manual genital 
contact. There is a dark side to Mr. Stocks. A dark underbelly to 
this man on the exterior with adults, young people and children [he] 
puts on a facade, of being someone who is of high moral character 
of great integrity. Who is then yielding too [sic] deeper-whether it 
is a psychological or simply a sexual issue that he has got, Your 
Honor. So let me read then a couple of quotes from the PSI to 
present that other side of Mr. Stocks. And I'm going to be quoting 
from the defendant's version starting on page four. 
(6/30/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-15.) 
The prosecutor discussed the facts of the case by quoting Stocks' version 
of the crime from the PSI. (6/30/11 Tr., p.14, L.13 - p.16, L.8; PSI, pp.4-6.) As 
the prosecutor read portions of Stocks' statements from the PSI to the district 
2 59 "Character letters" were attached to the PSI. (9/9/11 Certificate of Exhibits.) 
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court, the prosecutor noted that Stocks was 25 years old at the time of the crime 
and AG. was nine years old. (6/30/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-?, 20.) After reviewing the 
details of the crime as Stocks' described them, the prosecutor stated: 
This is the dark side of Mr. Stocks, Your Honor, an individual can-
can be student body president, can put on a facade to the people 
around him of what a good person of high moral standing he is. 
But if he is doing this on the side, he doesn't have good character, 
he doesn't have high moral standards, he is not in tuned [sic] with 
what is right and wrong in his associations with minors and he 
doesn't have integrity. 
(6/30/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.8-14.) 
The prosecutor reviewed the psychosexual evaluation and noted that he 
had some concerns about the portion of the evaluation that stated "Stocks shows 
some problems with anger" and Stocks "feels that he is being unjustly treated to 
some extent in the current case." (6/30/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-23 (internal quotations 
omitted); Psychosexual Evaluation, p.5.) As stated by the prosecutor: 
He feels he's being unjustly treated, Your Honor. He's concerned 
that he has to be a registered sex offender for the rest of his life. 
What about the rest of this victims [sic] life, what about the rest of 
this little nine year old ~irls [sic] life who is best friends with her 
uncle, her favorite uncle 3] and was abused and molested by him, 
by his admission on repeated occasions. 
(6/30/11 Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.1?, L.2.) 
Next, the prosecutor read the portion of the psychosexual evaluation that 
discussed Stocks' use of child pornography: 
However, he preferred instead-meaning Mr. Stocks 
again-However, he preferred instead looking at seven to ten year 
old females who were posing nude. He denies any interest in child 
pornography depicting male. He would look at child pornography 
3 Stocks was AG.'s "favorite uncle." (PSI, p.3.) Stocks' described AG. as his 
"favorite niece" and his "best buddy." (Psychosexual Evaluation, p.?) 
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for up to one to two hours at a time and would masturbate to either 
the child images or the adult images. During my interview with him 
Mr. Stocks estimated that he had looked at internet child 
pornography on upwards to thousands of occasions. Averaging 
about three times per week, he would typically masturbate while 
looking at this pornography. 
(6/30/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.11-19; Psychosexual Evaluation, p.8.) 
The prosecutor stated he had concerns regarding Stocks' argument for 
probation based on the statement in the psychosexual evaluation that Stocks 
"holds his victim responsible for the behavior because she wanted and liked the 
sex play that happened." (6/30/11 Tr., p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.9; Psychosexual 
Evaluation, p.6.) The prosecutor discussed Stocks' admission that he molested 
A.C. "over the course of a period of six to eight weeks" and noted that although 
Stocks had no prior criminal history, Stocks admitted he molested a 10 year old 
girl when he was 15 years old. (6/30/11 Tr., p.18, Ls.15-20; PSI, p.12; 
Psychosexual Evaluation, p.8.) 
The prosecutor addressed Stocks' argument "that he would like a chance 
on probation" and argued that although Stocks "had done well on release, I don't 
think that's a good indicator of what he would do on probation" based on the 
psychosexual evaluator's conclusion that Stocks "needs to be on an aggressive 
sex offender case load" because he is at "high moderate risk to reoffend." 
(6/30/11 Tr., p.18, L.21 - p.19, L.8 (internal quotations omitted); Psychosexual 
Evaluation, pp.11-12.) After discussing the objectives of sentencing, the 
prosecutor stated "[b]ased upon all of that and recommendations contained in the 
presentence investigation report the State is going to ask that the Court impose 
an underlying sentence in its discretion and retain jurisdiction in this case with a 
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recommendation for the therapeutic community" because "that would fit with Dr. 
Lindsey's estimation that he needs a heavily intensely supervised aggressive sex 
offender caseload." (6/30/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.S-17; Psychosexual Evaluation, p.12.) 
Defense counsel responded by again referring to the letters submitted in 
support of Stocks and by talking about Stocks' conduct after he was charged with 
this crime. (6/30/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.7-16.) Defense counsel referred back to the 
psychosexual evaluator's recommendation and concluded by stating the 
sentence that would "best satisfy the theories of punishment" would be giving 
Stocks "a chance of probation with lengthy incarceration as the key and 
impetuous and the deterrent that if he fails, even slightly, he is going to go away 
for a long time." (6/30/11 Tr., p.20, L.16 - p.21, L.5.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years with two years 
fixed and declined to retain jurisdiction. (R., pp.72-74; 6/30/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.1S-20; 
p.27, Ls.2-7.) Stocks filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's 
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.7S-S0.) 
S 
ISSUE 
Stocks states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the State of Idaho breach it's [sic] plea agreement with 
Mr. Stocks by its argument at the sentencing hearing? 
(Appellant's brief, p.2.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Stocks failed to show error, much less fundamental error, in the 




Stocks Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In the 
Prosecutor's Argument To The District Court At Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state agreed "not to recommend any 
harsher sentence than recommended in the Pre-Sentence Investigation." (R., 
pp.51-52; 5/26/11 Tr., p.1, L.24 - p.2, L.1.) At the sentencing hearing, the 
prosecutor requested that the district court retain jurisdiction in accordance with 
the presentence investigator's recommendation. (6/30/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.11-15; 
PSI, p.15.) The prosecutor also requested that the district court "impose an 
underlying sentence in its discretion." (6/30/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.13-14.) The 
prosecutor addressed the letters submitted on Stocks' behalf by family and 
friends, described the facts of the case by referring to the PSI and the 
psychosexual evaluation, discussed the objectives of sentencing, and explained 
why probation would not be appropriate based on the psychosexual evaluator's 
recommendation that Stocks needs "aggressive sex offender" treatment. (6/30/11 
Tr., p.12, L.7 - p.20, LA.) 
For the first time on appeal, Stocks argues that the state breached the 
plea agreement by "attacking the credibility of the various letter writers that 
presented information in mitigation" on his behalf, by stating Stocks has a "dark 
side," a "dark underbelly," and puts on a "fa9ade," by reading Stocks' description 
of the offense from the PSI, and by discussing statements Stocks made to the 
psychosexual evaluator. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) This argument fails for two 
reasons. First, Stocks did not object below, did not preserve this issue for 
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appellate review, and has failed to claim fundamental error. Second, even if 
reviewed for fundamental error, Stocks has failed to show that he was prejudiced 
by the alleged breach. 
B. Standard Of Review 
It is well settled that plea agreements are contractual in nature. State v. 
Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410, 64 P.3d 335, 336 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Fuhriman, 
137 Idaho 741, 744, 52 P.3d 886, 889 (Ct. App. 2002). As such, the 
interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea agreement are 
matters of law reviewed de novo. Doe, 138 Idaho at 41 0, 64 P .3d at 336. 
C. Stocks Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether 
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 
459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (objections at trial on other grounds did 
not preserve issue raised on appeal). Stocks did not object to the prosecutor's 
argument during sentencing and thus did not preserve his claim of an improper 
sentencing argument for appellate review. 
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes 
fundamental error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 
(Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to 
remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the 
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defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right 
to a fair trial in a fair tribunaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 
976 (2010). Unobjected to error will not be reviewed on appeal unless (1) the 
defendant demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated;" (2) the error is "clear or obvious" on the 
record, "without the need for any additional information" including information "as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant 
must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," 
generally by showing that the error "affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings." 1ft at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Application of this three prong test 
shows that Stocks has failed to show error, much less fundamental error.4 
Stocks cannot satisfy the first prong of the fundamental error test because 
his constitutional rights were never violated. Stocks has completely failed to 
demonstrate that any of his constitutional rights were violated because he has 
not shown that the plea agreement was actually breached. 
In making a sentencing recommendation pursuant to a plea agreement, 
the state is bound to honor the letter of the agreement and behave consistently 
with the terms of the agreement. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 
4 Stocks has not provided any analysis of the fundamental error test set forth by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry. Instead, Stocks has relied solely on prior 
Idaho case law that held that a breach of plea agreement automatically 
constitutes fundamental error that may be reviewed for the first time on appeal. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) However, that case law is no longer good law in light 
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Puckett v. United States, 556 
U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (2009). See State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782,241 P.3d 
955 (2010) (applying the Perry fundamental error test after the decision in 
Puckett.). 
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(1971); State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 616-17, 903 P.2d 1305, 1313-14 
(1995). The burden is on the defendant to show that the prosecutor's overall 
argument disavowed or was fundamentally at odds with the position the state 
was obligated to take pursuant to the plea agreement. Lankford, 127 Idaho at 
617, 903 P.2d at 1314 (sentence vacated because the state's comments at 
sentencing were "fundamentally at odds with the position the state was obligated 
to recommend"); State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 303, 77 P.3d 988, 992 (Ct. App. 
2003) (sentence vacated because the prosecutor's comments "effectively 
disavowed" the recommendation). However, "[t]he prosecution's obligation to 
recommend a sentence promised in a plea agreement does not carry with it the 
obligation to make the recommendation enthusiastically." Jones, 139 Idaho at 
302, 77 P.3d at 991. Consistent with these standards, the state's 
recommendation may include information that is unfavorable to the defendant if 
the information is relevant to the court's sentencing determination, and may 
remind the court of the applicable legal standards. State v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 
807, 810, 10 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussion of findings contained in 
the presentencing psychosexual evaluation does not constitute breach of a plea 
agreement); State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 40, 896 P.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 
1995) (discussion of "information relevant to the sentencing determination" and 
the "objectives of sentencing" does not constitute a breach of a plea agreement.). 
Stocks argues that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at the 
sentencing hearing by questioning "the credibility of the various letter writers that 
presented information in mitigation" on Stocks' behalf, stating that Stocks' had a 
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"dark side," a "dark underbelly," and he put on a "fagade," reading "from the 
presentence investigation, with excruciating detail," discussing "various 
statements" Stocks made during the psychosexual evaluation, and explaining 
why Stocks would not be an appropriate candidate for probation at this time. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) 
A similar argument, made under similar circumstances, was rejected by 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161,206 P.3d 867 
(Ct. App. 2009). In that case, Halbesleben argued that "the prosecutor's 
vigorous argument, taken as a whole, was inconsistent with the state's relatively 
lenient recommendation ... " Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 166, 206 P.3d at 872. In 
support of her argument, Halbesleben relied on "Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 92 P.3d 
549 [(Ct. App. 2004)] and State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 102 P.3d 380 (Ct. App. 
2004), which, in turn, cite to Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 77 P.3d 988, and State v. 
Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305 (1995)." 19.:. After reviewing the facts of 
those cases, the Court of Appeals stated the cases were distinguishable 
because: 
In each of the cases cited above, the prosecutor acknowledged the 
recommendation required by the plea agreement but argued 
various other reasons why the district court should not accept the 
recommendation and, instead, impose a more severe sentence. 
Or, in the case of Lankford, the prosecutor presented additional 
aggravating evidence which, at a sentencing for first degree 
murder, only served to favor imposition of the death penalty or fixed 
life. This was entirely inconsistent with the state's agreement to 
recommend an indeterminate term of life imprisonment. In the 
present case, the prosecutor made no allusion to a more severe 
recommendation contained in the PSI nor gave any personal 
opinion that Halbesleben's crimes merited a greater punishment 
than what was recommended. The prosecutor's vigorous argument 
did not undermine the sentencing recommendation but, rather, 
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buttressed it against any argument from defense counsel that 
Halbesleben merited even lesser sentences based on mitigating 
factors. Therefore, the prosecutor did not impliedly disavow the 
sentencing recommendation through her vigorous argument of the 
facts of Halbesleben's crimes and, thus, did not breach the plea 
agreement. 
Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 166-68, 206 P.3d at 872-874. 
Stocks' reliance on Daubs, Wills, Jones, and Lankford is also misplaced.5 
(Appellant's brief, pp.8-13, 16.) None of those cases even hints that it is possible 
to undermine a recommendation, and thus breach a plea agreement, merely by 
talking about the facts of the case or by drawing logical inferences therefrom. 
The prosecutor in this case did not present any argument to the district court that 
was inconsistent with the recommendation for retained jurisdiction. The 
prosecutor's argument was directed at rebutting Stocks' request for probation 
and ensuring the district court imposed an appropriate underlying sentence 
based on the seriousness of the offense. 
Stocks also argues that the prosecutor's "emphasis [on the nature of the 
offense] was completely unnecessary for a retained jurisdiction 
recommendation." (Appellant's brief, p.14.) This type of argument was also 
rejected in Halbesleben. Halbesleben argued that "even if the prosecutor's 
vigorous argument served the purpose of rebutting defense counsel's argument 
5 Stocks cites State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 64 P.3d 335 (Ct. App. 2003) in 
support of his argument as well. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) However, that case 
adds nothing to the analysis because it only addressed the issue of whether the 
state breached a plea agreement by requesting restitution after the defendant 
pled guilty. 
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for lesser sentences, the prosecutor's argument was 'overkill.'" Halbesleben, 147 
Idaho at 168, 206 P.3d at 874. Halbesleben alleged that "the argument 'far 
exceeded anything even remotely necessary to ensure .,. a penitentiary 
sentence given the circumstances of this case.'" lit The Court of Appeals 
rejected the argument, stating that: 
19.. 
Beyond this bare assertion, Halbesleben provides no other 
argument or authority for this proposition. Furthermore, we 
disagree with Halbesleben's conclusion. As stated above, defense 
counsel had already indicated an intention to seek lesser 
sentences. When the prosecutor began her argument, she had to 
dissuade the district court from any downward deviation from the 
recommended sentences in light of defense counsel's impending 
argument. Her vigorous argument and description of the hard facts 
of this case and their impact on the lives of Halbesleben's children 
justified her later statement to the district court that lesser 
sentences would depreciate the gravity of the crimes and not serve 
the necessary goal of protecting society. The prosecutor even 
argued this while encouraging the district court to follow the 
recommendation. As noted previously, the prosecutor gave no 
indication of an ulterior motive to seek harsher sentences and the 
district court's discretionary decision to deviate from the 
recommendation in favor of harsher penalties does not prove the 
existence of one. Therefore, the prosecutor's vigorous argument 
detailing the difficult facts of the case and the effect on the lives of 
the children did not constitute a breach of the plea agreement. 
As was the case in Halbesleben, the prosecutor's argument detailing the 
difficult facts of this case did not constitute a breach of the plea agreement. The 
prosecutor had to dissuade the district court from following the psychosexual 
evaluator's recommendation of probation and explain why the presentence 
investigator's recommendation of retained jurisdiction was more appropriate. 
The prosecutor also had to argue for an underlying sentence. It is not 
inconsistent for a prosecutor to argue for an underlying sentence after agreeing 
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to recommend retained jurisdiction because "[i]t is a common practice for a trial 
court to impose a rather severe underlying sentence as an incentive for the 
defendant to perform well in the retained jurisdiction program and to comply with 
the probation terms if the defendant is ultimately placed on probation." State v. 
Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676, 115 P.3d 764, 767 (Ct. App. 2005). The record 
shows that the state did not breach the plea agreement and Stocks has not 
demonstrated that any of his constitutional rights were violated. As such, Stocks 
has not satisfied the first prong of the fundamental error test. 
Stocks has also failed to satisfy the second prong of the fundamental error 
test. Under the second prong of the fundamental error test, the defendant must 
establish not only that there was an error, but that there was an error that is 
"clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any additional information" 
including information "as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. In the context of a plea agreement, 
"[u]nless the State has specifically agreed to the contrary, the prosecutor may 
legitimately refer to information relevant to the sentencing determination and may 
permissibly refer to the objectives of sentencing." State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 
31,40, 896 P.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The only agreement the state made regarding sentencing was that the 
state would "not ... recommend any harsher sentence than recommended in the 
Pre-Sentence Investigation." (R., pp.51-52; 5/26/11 Tr., p.1, L.24 - p.2, L.1.) The 
state followed the presentence investigator's recommendation and asked the 
district court to "retain jurisdiction" with a recommendation for the therapeutic 
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community because it "would fit with Dr. Lindsey's estimation that [Stocks] needs 
a heavily intensely supervised aggressive sex offender caseload." (6/30/11 Tr., 
p. 19, Ls. 11-17 ; PSI, p. 1 5.) 
Stocks asks this Court to infer from the record that the state was not 
arguing for an "underlying sentence" and "that the prosecutor was giving mere 'lip 
service' to the retained jurisdiction recommendations." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) 
However, Stocks has cited no authority, and the state is unaware of any, for the 
proposition that it is "clear or obvious" error for a prosecutor to provide a 
complete recitation of the facts of a case or to address the issue of the 
defendant's character at a sentencing hearing after the defendant raises it as an 
issue. The very nature of Stocks' arguments regarding whether there was a 
breach of the plea agreement demonstrates that there was no clear or obvious 
error because Stocks is simply asking this Court to believe his assertion, made 
for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor got "cold feet" at the sentencing 
hearing and was secretly requesting a prison sentence, as opposed to retained 
jurisdiction and an underlying sentence. (Appellant's brief, p.16.) 
All of the statements made by the prosecutor were supported by the 
record and there is no evidence the prosecutor was trying to somehow 
undermine his request that the district court retain jurisdiction in accordance with 
the presentence investigator's recommendation. The only specific statements 
Stocks is challenging that were not contentions of fact based on the information 
contained in the PSI and the psychosexual evaluation are the prosecutor's 
statements that Stocks had a "dark side," a "dark underbelly," and he put on a 
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"fa9ade." (Appellant's brief, p.14.) Although these are statements of opinion, they 
are opinions that are not in any way inconsistent with the state's recommendation 
that the district court should retain jurisdiction so that Stocks could receive the 
type of aggressive sex offender treatment recommended by the psychosexual 
evaluator in a secure environment. Therefore, Stocks has failed to show 
fundamental error because he has not shown that the error he claims is clear or 
obvious on the record. 
Finally, Stocks has made no showing that he was prejudiced by the 
alleged error. Under the third prong of the fundamental error test, "the defendant 
must further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless; i.e., 
that there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the 
triaL" State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376, _, 256 P.3d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 2011). 
When the error relates to sentencing, "the 'outcome' he must show to have been 
affected is his sentence." Puckett, 556 U.S. at _, 129 S.Ct. at 1433 n.4. "The 
defendant whose plea agreement has been broken by the Government will not 
always be able to show prejudice, either because he obtained the benefits 
contemplated by the deal anyway (e.g., the sentence that the prosecutor 
promised to request) or because he likely would not have obtained those benefits 
in any event .... " !i:L. at _, 129 S.Ct. at 1432-33. 
Stocks does not claim his sentence would have been any different if the 
prosecutor had discussed the facts of the case less or if the prosecutor had 
made different arguments at the sentencing hearing. (See Appellant's brief, 
pp.14-17.) Stocks was advised multiple times that the district court was not 
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bound by the plea agreement (5/26/11 Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, LA.; p.7, L.24 - p.8, 
L.13; R., p.52) and the district court had a duty to consider the entire record at 
the sentencing hearing, see State v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735,739, 932 P.2d 363, 
367 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based not 
only on what has been learned during trial, but also on information gathered from 
many other sources, and a trial court's duty to arrive at a sentence appropriate to 
an individual defendant necessitates access to a wide range of information."). 
Even assuming the prosecutor somehow breached the plea agreement by 
describing "factual instances with excruciating detail, pulling the proverbial 
heartstrings of the court" (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15), the extent to which the 
prosecutor referred to the PSI and the psychosexual evaluation at the sentencing 
hearing is irrelevant to the determination of whether there was prejudice because 
the district court had already given those reports "close consideration" prior to 
sentencing. (6/30/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.14-17.) There is no evidence in the record 
indicating that the district court changed the sentence it was going to impose 
based on any of the statements the prosecutor made. In short, Stocks has failed 
to satisfy the third prong of the fundamental error test because he has failed to 
show any prejudice. 
Stocks has not demonstrated clear constitutional error and he has failed to 
establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged breach in any way. The state's 
argument at the sentencing hearing was focused on the egregiousness of 
Stocks' offense - in other words, the facts of the case. Such an argument is 
entirely consistent with the sentencing recommendation of retained jurisdiction 
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because the state was legally entitled to present argument regarding the 
underlying sentence, which was not covered by the plea agreement. Stocks' 
belief that the prosecutor's argument was too long or that it was somehow more 
compelling than strictly necessary to achieve the sentence that was sought, is 
without legal or factual merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentence imposed 
by the district court. 
DATED this 6th day of January 2012. 
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